Afghan IDP Camps: A Look at Structure
By John Dwyer
Sxirine.com
14 June, 2004
Camps
for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Herat, Afghanistan,
have been in existence since the mid-1990s. Because of the long
drought that beset Afghanistan, IDPs were flocking to urban
areas and it was for those IDPs that the camps were formed.
Subsequently, victims of destruction caused by the chronic wars
and those who had fled their villages because of ethnic
tensions, arrived at the camps. All were poor and most were
landless.
In 2002, I coordinated activities within three IDP camps. Our
purpose was to enable the IDPs to have a stable and safe
environment that provided them life’s basic provisions, while
they awaited the time when they could return to their villages
of origin.
Surveys were being conducted by international organizations in
many of the IDPs villages of origin to determine what was needed
to enable returnees to live both peacefully and decently. These
surveys investigated the living conditions, security, water
availability, land availability, food distribution, and other
important survival factors. The surveys were not fully completed
when I left the camps. Returns, however, were taking place. Rain
was falling in many areas, and crops began to flourish again.
The crops, however, did not subdue the ethnic tensions forcing
Afghans to search for safer living environment in the IDP camps.
Historial inter-tribal tensions were exacerbated by war and
drought. Some Pashtuns were asking to be sent to Kandahar, a
predominately Pashtun area, because of the tensions. During the
return period of IDPs to their places of origin, there was some
fierce criticism of the U.N. by other international
organizations that the U.N. was more interested in returning
IDPs to their villages than they were with the welfare of the
IDPs. There was also political pressure from warlord Ismail
Khan, the governor of Herat Province. His concern was that IDPs
would stay in Herat and become a burden on the local economy.
There was a combined population of forty thousand in the three
camps—enough to fill a medium-sized town. When IDPs arrived at
the camps they were registered and then sent to a camp medical
clinic for a health evaluation. They were given needed
vaccinations at the clinic. The IDPs were also assigned to a
permanent shelter structure if any were available. When the
population of the largest camp, Shaidayee, increased to over
20,000 we began issuing tents to each family. Each family also
received a heater and charcoal or firewood in the winter and we
periodically gave them sanitary kits, clothes and other
essential items.
Logistics in the camps was one of our major problems.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided supplies such as
sanitation kits and clothing. Even when supplies were available,
transport was a major issue. I recall one very large shipment of
charcoal was delayed for months and then arrived at the
beginning of the warm season.
When
families returned to their home villages they received a
monetary allowance of around $100US. The families also received
agricultural tools, a supply of seeds for planting, and a
three-month supply of wheat, and some building materials. NGOs
oversaw the areas where the IDPs reurned to and helped
facilitate the adjustment of the families.
The camps brought together all of the diverse tribes that
populate Afghanistan: Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashtuns, and
members of smaller ethnic groups. But IDPs lived segregated
existences: they usually arrived at the camps in homogenous
ethnic groups and remained within their own groups during their
stay at the camps. Despite the ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, I
never received a report of ethnic conflicts among the residents
of the camps I managed. The political life in the camps was
surprisingly well structured along ethnic lines. Groups of
families, usually from the same village or area, chose leaders
to represent them. These leaders worked with camp management and
discussed the concerns and grievances of their constituencies.
The reported conflicts I did receive—always in the largest
camp—involved the local military unit, who were primarily Tajiks.
The Tajik soldiers allegedly entered dwellings of Pashtun
families and accused them of being Taliban sympathizers and of
hiding weapons. They then searched the dwelling and harassed the
occupants. There were also reports that these soldiers removed
young Pashtun men from their residences and took them to a jail
in central Herat where they were accused of being Taliban
soldiers, beaten, and badly mistreated. When the ethnic leaders
in the camps reported incidents such as these, the complaints
were immediately communicated to both the Ministry of
Repatriation (MoR,the Afghan governmental authority responsible
for the camps) and to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). More often than not, it was difficult to
identify the actual perpetrators of the reported crimes, but the
MoR did transfer units of the local militia unit away from the
camp and replaced them with other units. The new units, also
members of the local militia and Tajiks, were apparently told to
stay out of the camps. There were no further reported incidents.
Women's Issues
Most camp women did not wear burkas, the loose over-garment
that covers a woman’s face and body. Rather, the majority of the
women in the camps wore the colorful dress of their tribes and
areas of origin and their faces were uncovered. The uncovered
faces of the women conflicted with my preconceptions. I asked a
local focal point about the difference in attitude and dress of
the IDP women, and was told that the rural women, whether Tajik
or Kuchi, were not as sheltered from public life as city women.
Apparently, Tajik or Kuchi rural women participated openly in
the daily public life of their tribes and villages.
Due to the nature of my work at the camps I wasn’t able to
travel to the rural villages. But my personal experiences in
Herat seemed to validate this information. When I was invited to
homes in Herat the women were separated from the men. I might be
introduced to a wife, but then she disappeared into the kitchen
and the men gathered together. In the camps, when I was invited
into a family home or tent, both the husband and wife talked
with me. Whether this was in deference to my position as a camp
manager or a cultural difference I could not determine. I have
been told by educated Afghan women that the rural women not only
work in the fields but also manage the economic issues for their
families. Urban women, in the past, have remained at home and
raised their children and were not involved in the economic
decisions. The women I talked with thought that the total
involvement of rural women in all phases of family and civic
life led to their assertiveness.
There was one issue the IDP women would not talk to me or any
other male about: mistreatment or criminal acts committed
against them. We, in camp management, found out about such acts
only from either block leaders or from the female medical staff.
Female members of the UNHCR staff and their local assistants
were constantly on the alert for the mistreatment of women. Dr.
Lynn Amowitz, M.D., of Physicians for Human Rights U.S.A,
conducted a study about women and Pashtuns, titled “Persistent
Abuses of Pashtuns.” It is available at
www.phrusa.org. This study
was conducted in the largest camp which I managed, Shadaiyee.
Camp Leadership
An Afghan male national in each camp assumed the title,
“National Focal Point.” He spoke English and Dari —a popular
national language. They met frequently with IDP leaders and kept
us informed about what was happening within the camps. The local
community coveted the focal point’s jobs because they were well
paid and, perhaps more importantly, they were jobs in an area
with very high unemployment.
The men worked very hard. Because of their positions as bridges
to the international administrators they were under pressure
from the camp residents and local government officials. During
periods when we experienced problems with food distribution the
focal points took the heat. They never complained to me about
such pressure, and I do not see how it could have been avoided.
They were on the front line and the IDPs and the internationals
depended heavily on them.
The focal point in the largest camp, which reached a population
as high as 28,000 people, was a trained Afghan medical doctor,
called Dr. Bashir. Dr. Bashir chose to be a focal point not just
because of the salary he received, but also because of his
desire to help the IDPs. I assume his motivation to become a
medical doctor and his medical training contributed to his
empathy for the IDPs. He was deeply and sincerely concerned
about the IDP’s welfare. Dr. Bashir was a Tajik by birth but his
concern for the IDPs was ethnically inclusive. During a period
of ethnic tensions in the north we began receiving large numbers
of Pashtuns, who had been displaced and were forced to flee
their home areas. When rumbles of mistreatment by the local
militia began to surface, he immediately reported the incidents
to me and tenaciously followed up until the problem was solved.
As the camp population varied from day to day, Dr. Bashir also
made sure that I knew the number of new arrivals daily so that I
could order the proper amount of food for the following day. He
was detail-oriented, very organized, and kept good records.
A typical day started at 8:00 AM. I would meet individually with
each of the focal points of the three camps. We discussed
ongoing projects and any problems that needed urgent solutions.
One camp might have a latrine problem, another broken water
wells. Severe weather, wind, and heavy rain often caused
flooding in the camps that destroyed shelters. On some days a
camp focal point might tell me that the doctor in the medical
clinic had reported an increased incidence of diarrhea cases in
his camp. This might have been caused by a water quality
problem, or maybe the sanitation in the kitchens collapsed to
unhealthy standards. I then would call cooperating agencies that
worked with us and relay the doctor’s report to assure swift
remedial action.
The focal points and I worked closely together to solve camp
problems. Because of the lack of local resources, there were
instances when we had to call international agencies for
assistance. When the focal points felt that a particular
circumstance (i.e. broken water wells or the need for more
tents) required the services of an NGO or U.N. agency, they
informed me, not because the focal points couldn’t handle such
problems, but because I had to justify their needs in formal
requests to the international agencies.
The focal points were an invaluable bridge to the local culture.
I tended to want to believe everything the local people told me
when they spoke of problems or asked for aid. However, the focal
points were better able to distinguish between those IDPs who
were truly in need, and those who wanted to take advantage of
the system. There were times when local residents from the city
would arrive at the camps and try to register as IDPs. By
registering, the residents would obtain services such as food
distribution and other supplies provided to authentic IDPs.
Checkpoints, located on the major roads into Herat, as far as
three to four hours away, were meant to turn back false IDPs.
But locals wishing to subvert the system would find ways to get
forged documents that indicated the areas from which they had
fled. The local focal points, however, were not fooled by these
forged documents.
Once, due to a lack of supplementary food distribution, I
received an emergency radio call from the focal point of one of
the camps. He said a large group of IDPs—numbering in the
hundreds—had gathered in front of his office in a “food revolt.”
He and his staff were unable to leave the office. I called our
chief of operations who, in turn, called U.N. security. The U.N.
security officer and the local military dispersed the crowd.
After the crowd left, and the demonstration was quelled, I met
with the leaders of the IDPs and listened to their grievances.
The leaders told me that their people desperately needed variety
in their diet and wanted to supplement the loaf of enriched
bread each of them received daily. They asked for cooking oil
and beans. I promised the leaders that I would plead their case
to the World Food Program (WFP), which was responsible for the
distribution of the food. I then met with WFP officials, and WFP
began a supplemental food distribution program. The IDPs were
both satisfied and grateful.
This type of cooperation between the local leaders and the
international organizations was vital to the successful
operation of the camps. The local leaders, being close to their
people, were aware of the needs, desires, and complaints of the
IDPs. They would communicate these issues to the focal points
and internationals, and we would address the issues before they
became major problems.
Camp Blocks
The camps were divided into blocks. Block leaders, chosen by camp residents, were usually men who had led the village or ethnic groups prior to their arrival at the camps. The groups historically trusted these men and their function as block leaders was a natural outgrowth of this trust. Block leader meetings were held weekly. Extra meetings were called if and when major problems arose that demanded immediate solutions. We met in a large tent. In the largest camp, seventy traditionally dressed rural Afghan leaders gathered with my staff and myself.
At times, guests from non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
or other international organizations would come to explain what
had caused a particular problem and how it was being solved. An
example of a problem occurred when we first began the daily
distribution of a loaf of enriched bread to each camp resident.
The block leaders reported to us that a problem with quality was
causing unrest in the camp. The representative of the NGO which
was running the baking operation came to the weekly block
leaders meeting and discussed the problem. Block leaders brought
examples of loaves which had broken into small pieces. The
representative of the NGO explained to the block leaders what
was causing the baking problem and how he would solve it. He
also brought loaves of bread that had been baked that day to
show the improvement. The block leaders then returned to their
people and told them that the quality problem had been solved.
At the meetings each leader was given a chance to express his
opinions. We asked the leaders how they thought each identified
problem could be solved. If it were possible for us to agree to
the proposed solution, we would do so. Issues that could not be
solved at one meeting were submitted for study or resolution and
then taken up at the next meeting. The men were serious and
thoughtful; they held fairly powerful positions within the camps
and from time to time rumors arose that they were taking
personal advantage of their positions.
One area ripe for exploitation was food distribution. When bags
of wheat were being distributed to the IDPs, rumors claimed that
some block leaders had extra registration cards that they used
to obtain extra wheat that they would then sell at the local
market. Apparently they would have proxies present the
fraudulent cards. A switch to bread distribution instead of
bagged wheat stopped these rumors.
Because of the size of the camps we, as camp management, needed
to have an internal structure through which we could communicate
with camp residents. Block leaders provided this critical
avenue. It was from them that we first heard of the militia
entering domiciles and harassing camp residents. They would also
tell us their people’s needs such as firewood, fuel, or
clothing.
The block leaders also met with the local MoR official who
oversaw each camp. Because of the dual oversight structure of
the camps, a tension existed between the MoR and the
international organizations. My guess is that part of the
tension could have been caused by the fact that international
organizations appeared to be well-funded, whereas the ministries
were not. Apparently MoR employees wages did not equal those of
either the internationals or the locals employed by the
international organizations. Sometimes, following meetings with
the block leaders, the MoR official would approach the camp
focal points with complaints they said they received from block
leaders. These complaints usually involved food or shelter
problems. Yet, the block leaders supposedly never complained to
the MoR officials about security problems because they felt the
officials might be colluding with the military. Thus, the MoR
reports were often questionable.
The MoR officials were underpaid political bureaucrats; some of
them were former Taliban officials. Because of their previous
associations, and perhaps unfairly, I never felt I could really
trust them to carry out their duties with a sincere desire to
help the IDPs.
One particular block leader spoke for 500 Pashtun Kuchis
families. He was, in effect, their chief. A stocky man of medium
height with an intelligent face and a charming demeanor, he
could have run for office and won in most Western countries. The
Pashtun Kuchis were nomads who, with their animals, moved around
to verdant pastures where they could graze their livestock. They
were a landless people. The chief told us that they last lived
in an area badly affected by drought and armed conflict. His
people had to sell their camels and goats to pay for their move
to Herat where they could obtain assistance. Being Pashtuns, who
are associated with the Taliban, they were also subject to human
rights violations and violent abuses from other groups. In the
area where they had lived, Uzbeks predominated. The worried
chief asked us if we would assure him and his group security and
assistance if they decided to return to the area in which they
had last lived. The chief explained to me that his people, whose
ancestors for centuries had been nomads, now wanted to settle
down in that area and educate their children.
Maintaining Good Health
Lines of IDPs formed early at the medical clinic in each camp and remained until mid-afternoon when the clinics closed. Both a male doctor and a female doctor would be on duty. (The IDP women would not permit male doctors to care for them.) The major medical problems were directly related to the weather. During cold weather there was a spike in the cases of respiratory illness; in warmer weather allergies and heat-related illnesses predominated. There were also some diagnosed cases of tuberculosis (TB). Victims of TB were immediately taken to the local general hospital for care. Unfortunately, I heard through the grapevine that there was a severe shortage of medicines to treat tuberculosis in Afghanistan.
There were special supplementary feeding programs in the
camps for children under fifteen years of age and for lactating
and pregnant women. The feeding programs were done under an
agreement between the WFP and an implementing NGO.
We also had a mortuary in the camps. It was located in a simple
silver tent and was sparsely furnished with wooden boards and
curtains hanging at the entrance to provide privacy. A coffin
and burial shroud were provided for the deceased. A Muslim
cleric, an IDP in the camp, performed the Muslim religious rite
of washing the body. The deceased was buried, on the day of
death, in a nearby cemetery. Fortunately, and probably due to
the high level of medical care in the IDP camps, the mortality
rate in the camps was lower than in many villages in
Afghanistan.
Work Finished?
My workday ended, as it typically began, with meetings with
the camp focal points. We recapped the day. We discussed how
many people had returned to their villages of origin and how
many new arrivals had entered the camps. Knowledge of any change
in camp population was important because of the need to plan
distribution of food and other essential items. We also
discussed progress on projects under way, security in the camps,
medical emergencies, camp visitors, and the many other daily
events to consider to ensure good camp management.
My time as manager of the camps began in January 2002. Prior to
my arrival, criticism was directed at some of the IDP camps by
both NGOs and journalists. Waves of IDPs were arriving at the
facilities and, at times, overwhelming the infrastructure. To
deny any problems existed would be to deny reality. The arrival
of literally thousands of IDPs at facilities built to house much
smaller populations was extremely difficult to deal with.
Because of the war, the inclement weather and poor and dangerous
roads, vitally needed supplies trickled in. Camp management was
constantly in a crisis management mode trying to make do with
too few supplies for too many people. At my arrival, however,
the overwhelming flow of IDPs had begun to subside and we were
able to at least stay close to a balance of supplies for the new
arrivals.
I never heard criticism of the camps from the local population.
In fact, as is stated elsewhere, many locals tried to register
at the camps to get distributions of food and supplies. In the
oldest of the camps, close to the city of Herat, some of the
IDPs held regular jobs locally. The local government had some
concern that the IDPs might decide to stay and become a burden
on the already strapped government finances.
In mid-2002 the organization I worked for, due to lack of
funding, relinquished the management of the camps. I went on to
Kandahar to do development work. The general oversight of the
IDP camps was assumed by another international organization.
However the day-to-day management, my job, was taken over by Dr.
Bashir and the other focal points.
Early this year the population of IDPs at Shadaiyee Camp was
down to 3,000 residents and some of the other camps have closed.
Sadly, I believe, internationally funded IDP camps will be a
part of Afghanistan for many years. Peace has returned to most
areas but tensions persist. After decades of war the country’s
infrastructure has been badly damaged. Warlords control most of
the country and security is non-existent in rural areas.
Afghanistan is, at this point, seemingly ungovernable as an
integrated national entity. Political instability persists—and
where there is instability there are IDPs and refugees.